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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to point out that dollarization, apart from
being a commitment device, may also be used as a signaling device if there
is uncertainty about the government’s intentions. To this end, we modify the
standard approach to modeling monetary policy by introducing two types of
government: good and bad. It is assumed that the good government conducts
optimal policy while the bad government prefers to ﬁnance higher (than
optimal) government expenditure by printing money. People do not observe
the type of government, however they know the probability distribution over
the two government types. Due to this uncertainty, the good government
cannot achieve the ﬁrst best even if it conducts optimal monetary policy.
Hence, the good government has an incentive to dollarize, while the bad
governments avoids this step. As a result, we obtain a separating equilibrium
where dollarization is a perfect signal of the government type.
JEL: E42, F40
Keywords: dollarization, monetary policyWORKING PAPER No. 63 
Non-technical Summary
This paper contributes to the debate about optimal dollarization. The exist-
ing literature points out the on the one hand dollarization is costly since it
strips a country of independent monetary policy. On the other hand dollar-
ization has its beneﬁts for countries with the time inconsistency issues, since
it can be used as a commitment device to solve them. This paper points
out that there is yet another potential beneﬁt from dollarization, it might
improve credibility of government since it allows it to signal its intentions,
thus serving as a signaling device rather than a commitment device.
We employ a standard general equilibrium model with money and extend
it to allow for uncertainty about the macroeconomic policy. To make our
argument clear we simplify the economy as much as possible. In our economy
there are two types of goods: cash and credit goods. In order to purchase
cash goods one needs cash, but credit goods can be purchased both with cash
and credit (repaid at the end of each period). Both consumption and credit
goods are produced with the same constant returns to scale technology that
uses labor as an input.
Our economy is populated by households, ﬁrms and government. Gov-
ernment runs a balanced budget in each period (this is a simplifying as-
sumption that allows to avoid the time inconsistency problem that would
blur the picture) and conducts monetary and ﬁscal policy. We assume that
there are two types of government, good and bad. The Good government
wants to conduct optimal monetary and ﬁscal policy while the bad govern-
ment wants to increase the government expenditure above the optimal level.
Since, we assume that it is not possible to ﬁnance this increase with the
regular taxes, government has to use the inﬂation tax instead. In the be-
ginning of each period government decides whether to dollarize or not. If
the government decides to dollarize then it cannot use the inﬂation tax as
a source of income and the government expenditure are set at the optimal
level, if the government does not decide to dollarize it can use the inﬂation
tax as a source of revenue. Households act in the assets markets, the labor
market and the goods markets. In the beginning of each period household
do not know the type of government they only know the probabilities and
observe whether government dollarized or not. In the assets market they
trade cash and state contingent bonds. In the labor market, without knowl-
edge of macroeconomic policy (and the type of government), they supply
labor. Finally, in the goods market they observe macroeconomic policy and
then buy cash and credit goods. Firms do not play any important role here
they just produce cash and credit goods using labor. Agents, while making
their labor supply decision, are uncertainty about the type of government,
therefore they also are uncertain about inﬂation. This uncertainty distorts
their choice and results in equilibrium allocation that is not optimal.
In equilibrium the good government dollarizes and the bad government
does not dollarize. Why is that? Note that since, in this simple cash-in-
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advance economy with no nominal stickiness the optimal monetary policy
satisﬁes the Friedman rule. Furthermore, we assume that dollarization brings
monetary policy that satisﬁes the Friedman rule. Thus, by dollarizing the
good government imports optimal monetary policy. But, if dollarization
were not possible the good government would conduct exactly the same
policy, anyway. Nevertheless the outcome would not be optimal because of
the uncertainty about the type of government. Thus, the good government
does not dollarize to solve the time inconsistency problem, because there is
no time inconsistency problem. The problem here is that the uncertainty
about the type of governments distorts the decision of private agents in the
economy and dollarization allows the good government to reveal its type,
thus eliminating the uncertainty and, in result, the distortion. Therefore,
here it plays the role of a signaling device rather than a commitment device.
Furthermore, dollarization has real eﬀects as it allows to bring down inﬂation
expectations.
The assumption that a dollarized country imports optimal monetary pol-
icy is not crucial for the result. The result would still go through as long as
the imported monetary policy were not ”far” from optimal and the proba-
bility that government is bad were high enough. Though, this set up just
makes our argument clearer.
Non-technical SummaryIntroduction
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1 Introduction
There are many countries, for example in Latin America, that have a long
history of high inﬂation rates. In a number of these countries, governments
conducted policies, that were not necessarily optimal for the societies they
governed. As a result, in these countries, the public does not trust its gov-
ernment. Furthermore, many countries do not have long stable tradition
of independent central bank. In some countries, even the guarantee of the
independence of central bank in the constitution, does not ensure public be-
lief in the low inﬂation policy. As the result of this heritage, a government
that wants to implement optimal policy has low credibility. In such cases,
establishing reputation is costly both in terms of welfare and GDP hence,
dollarization may lead to savings on the costs of gaining credibility. We want
to study this problem from the point of view of such a government, and see
how dollarization can solve the problem of the lack of trust.
The standard argument for dollarization is that it brings credibility since
it is a commitment device. We propose a new mechanism for building reputa-
tion through dollarization. We argue that dollarization may bring credibility
since it provides the way to signal the intentions of government. Therefore,
we build a model with two types of government: good and bad1. The good
government wants to conduct optimal policy, and the bad government wants
to use inﬂationary taxation in order to increase government expenditure
above the socially optimal level2. The knowledge of the type of govern-
ment is private, the public knows only the probability distribution over the
government types. Since the good government is overshadowed by the bad
government, it cannot achieve optimal outcome, even if it conducts optimal
policy. In the model there is a separating equilibrium: the good government
dollarizes and the bad government does not dollarize. Hence, dollarization
has real eﬀects, even though it does not change the actual policy, as it would
be the case if dollarization was a commitment device. Thus in our model
dollarization plays the role of a signaling device rather than a commitment
device. It allows the good government to signal its type.
The model is a standard cash-credit goods model. We also assume that
the government’s budget is balanced in each period to avoid any complica-
tions with time inconsistency (coming from the fact that government may
want to default on its debt). The only source of uncertainty in the model is
the type of government.
The key force that drives the result is the fact that expected inﬂation
is costly even if at the end the actual inﬂation is low. We assume that
people decide how much labor to supply before they know monetary policy
therefore, they base their decision on expectations. Dollarization brings
down inﬂation expectations, so it improves welfare. In this view dollarization
1The idea of having two types of government is taken from Phelan (2006).
2Click (1998) documents that seigniorage accounted for a large share of government
income in many Latin American countries in the 1970s and 1980s.Introduction
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brings instantaneous reputation at no cost. The results are not driven by
time inconsistency, since the only reason why the good government cannot
achieve an optimal allocation is the fact that people are unsure whether
they deal with the good or the bad government. Dollarization allows the
good government to separate itself from the bad government.
There is an extensive literature on the pros and cons of dollarization (see
Borensztein and Berg, 2000). The two most important arguments in favor
of dollarization are that it allows to import credibility which results in lower
inﬂation, and can increase trade by eliminating the exchange rate risk and
the transaction costs associated with the currency exchange, for example see
Alesina and Barro (2002). Similarly Cooper and Kempf. (2001) argue that
dollarization may solve the time inconsistency problem, and Mendoza (2001)
analyzes how dollarization can be beneﬁcial by eliminating the distortions
created by the exchange rate uncertainty and by weakening the informational
and institutional frictions in the credit market. The main argument against
dollarization is that it strips countries oﬀ the monetary independence. For
example Cooley and Quadrini (2001) analyze the eﬀect of dollarization in
the case of Mexico. They assume that the Mexican government conducts
optimal policy and that the US policy is not optimal for Mexico. As the
result in their model dollarization leads to non optimal policy, and does not
improve the Mexican welfare. There are many more arguments for dollar-
ization than presented above. To name just a few, Calvo (2001) argues that
dollarization solves the ’fear of ﬂoating’ problem, and in the recent paper
Arellano and Heathcote (2007) show that dollarization may broaden the ac-
cess to ﬁnancial markets. They show, that since dollarization increases the
value of maintaining access to international ﬁnancial markets, it makes it
costlier for governments to default, thereby increasing the amount of debt
that can be supported in equilibrium.
The crucial contribution of this paper to the literature is to point out
that dollarization may improve credibility of government by signaling its
intentions. We show that in the presence of uncertainty regarding the goals
of government dollarization provides means to signal those goals. Hence, our
work shows the mechanism of credibility building through dollarization that
to the best of our knowledge has been absent from the debate. We want
to stress that our argument complements the existing literature instead of
rivaling it.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section 2 we show how
governments behave in our framework. In section 3 we present the model.
In section 4 we show the results. Section 5 concludes the paper.Preliminaries
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2 Preliminaries
Our paper extends and modiﬁes the Lucas and Stockey (1983) economy.
First we introduce the uncertainty of the type of government, second we
allow each government to dollarize or not. Furthermore, following Svensson
(1985) and Albanesi et al. (2003), we require households to use money accu-
mulated in the previous period to purchase cash good in the current period.
We use a version of a cash-credit good model with households, producers
and government. Households buy consumption, supply labor and trade as-
sets. Government collects taxes, issues money and ﬁnances the stream of
government expenditure.
In this section we take a closer look at the behavior of government in a
world with no uncertainty about the type of government and no possibility
of dollarization. We examine the behavior of both types of government when
agents know exactly the type of government they face. In the next section
we introduce a fully speciﬁed model with the uncertainty about the type of
government and the choice of whether to dollarize or not.
There are 2 types of government: good government, θg, and bad gov-
ernment, θb. Denote the type of government as, θ ∈ {θg,θb}. Government
decides on the level of government expenditure G and on the growth rate of
money µ. Denote the government’s policy as π.
2.1 Households
There is measure one of households, Households take government’s policy,
π, as given. Each household starts each period with nominal assets a. In the
beginning of each period in the assets market, the households trade money,
m, and one-period bonds, b. Each bond costs q and pays one unit of nominal
value in the next period. The asset market constraint has the following form
m + qb ≤ a (1)
We also impose a no-Ponzi constraint of the form b ≤ ¯ b, where ¯ b is a large,
ﬁnite upper bound. Next the households split into two parties. One party
goes to the goods market and buys cash goods, c1, with money, credit goods,
c2, with credit, and next period assets, a�. The other party goes to the labor
market and supplies labor, l. Since cash goods can only be bought with
money each household faces the cash-in-advance constraint
Pc1 ≤ m (2)
where P denotes the price level. The budget constraint in the goods market
has the following form
µa
� + Pc2 + Pc1 ≤ Wl + m − PT + b (3)Preliminaries
N a t i o n a l   B a n k   o f   P o l a n d 10
2
where T denotes lump sum taxes. Denote aggregate values with capital
letters, and individual values with small letters. We follow Albanesi et al.
(2003) in normalizing all nominal variables by dividing each nominal vari-
able (money, nominal assets, bonds, price and wage) in each period by the
aggregate stock of nominal assets, so A = 1. Due to this normalization we
have µ in the households budget constraint (3). The household have the
following instantaneous utility function
u(c1,c2,G,l) = logc1 + logc2 + ξ logG + log(1 − l)
Denote the vector (m,b,c1,c2,l,a�) as x, the problem of the household, given
governments’ policy π, takes the following form
V (a;π) = max
x
�
logc1 + logc2 + ξ logG + log(1 − l) + βV (a�;π)




We assume that a government runs a balanced budget3.




where M denotes the money supply4. Furthermore, we assume that govern-
ment has only limited ability to collect taxes5. Let ¯ T be an upper limit on
taxes. The value of the limit is provided at the end of this section. This
limit puts a constraint on a government and it cannot freely choose the level
of government expenditure and the growth rate of money.
2.3 Producers and Resource Constraint
For simplicity we assume the following production function
y = l
Furthermore, we assume that cash, credit and government goods are pro-
duced with the same technology, which implies that all goods have the same
price P. Zero proﬁt condition implies
P = W (6)
3We assume that the budget is balanced to avoid the time inconsistency problems
associated with incentives to deﬂate government debt, for details see Lucas and Stokey
(1983).
4We also impose a standard constraint that the interest rates are non-negative which
translates into the following constraint µ ≥ β.
5There are many possible reasons for that. For example could be due to ineﬃcient tax
collection or due to political constraints.Preliminaries
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Feasibility condition takes the following form
C1 + C2 + G = Y = L (7)
In the assets market, since government cannot borrow or lend, the ag-
gregate stock of bonds is equal to zero
B = 0 (8)
Furthermore, since the aggregate stock of nominal assets is normalized to
one, we have the constraint in the nominal assets market
A = 1 (9)
Also, given that B = 0, we have the constraint for the money market
M = 1 (10)
2.4 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Next we use the standard concept of recursive competitive equilibrium to
describe the behavior of the private economy. Agents in the economy take
the government’s policy as given and optimize their decisions.
Deﬁnition 1 A recursive competitive equilibrium, given the government pol-
icy π, is an individual policy function x(a;π), a value function V (a;π), an
aggregate policy function X(π), and prices (P(π),W(π),q(π)) such that
(i) x(a;π) and V (a;π), given π, X (π) and prices, solve the household’s
problem (4).
(ii) aggregate and individual choices coincide x(1;π) = X (π).
(iii) producers satisfy (6).
(iv) the government budget, (5), is satisﬁed
(v) all markets clear, (8) − (10) are satisﬁed.














G = (µ − 1)β
1 − G
β + 2µ
+ T, T ≤ ¯ T (14)Preliminaries
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Note that social optimality requires C1 = C2, and in our case we have
µC1 = βC2. Thus, if growth rate of money is higher than the one implied
by the Friedman rule6, µ > β, it creates a wedge in cash good-credit good
choice, that distorts economy away from social optimum. Also the higher µ
the farther away is the economy from optimum.
2.5 Markov Problem
In this subsection we describe the behavior of both types of government.
We specify their objectives and later we describe the choices that both gov-
ernments make in a Markov equilibrium. Since we focus on the case when
governments have no ability to commit, we are going to use the concept of
Markov problem rather than the Ramsey problem. Governments here choose
the policy today and take the future policy as given. The precise deﬁnition
of Markov equilibrium is presented at the end of this subsection. Both types




uθ(c1,c2,G,l) + βV θ(1;π)
subject to (11) − (14)
�
(15)
where, V θ(1,π) is deﬁned on the equilibrium path of (c1,c1,G,l) given gov-





where uθg(c1,c2,G,l) = logc1+logc2+ξ logG+log(1−l), uθb(c1,c2,G,l) =
logc1 + logc2 + ξblogG + log(1 − l), ξb > ξ. We assume that the good
government maximizes the utility of the representative agent, but the bad
government maximizes the utility that assigns higher value to the govern-
ment expenditure than the representative agent’s utility.
The limit on lump sum taxes, ¯ T, is such that it is enough to ﬁnance
the socially optimal level of government expenditure, but not the level that
is preferred by the bad government. Thus if the bad government wants to
increase the government expenditure it has to print money. We set ¯ T =
(1 + ¯ ξ − β)/(3 + ¯ ξ), where ξ < ¯ ξ < ξb. We would like to stress that there
is more than one way of modelling why governments do bad things. Our
way of modeling bad government captures simple intuition, that there are
situations that governments print too much money. Next we deﬁne a Markov
equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2 A Markov equilibrium is: (1) a policy π(θ); and (2) a recur-
sive competitive equilibrium, s.t.
(i) the policy of type θ government solves the Markov problem, (15), given
RCE.
6Since this is the cash-credit goods model with no nominal stickiness optimal monetary
policy satisﬁes the Friedman rule, and the optimal growth rate of money is equal to β−1.Preliminaries
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It is straightforward do ﬁnd a Markov equilibrium. We ﬁnd that in a Markov
equilibrium the good government chooses G =
ξ
3+ξ, µ = β and the bad gov-




3+ξ, µ = β
1+ξb





(1+ξb)(3+¯ ξ). Note that without the limit on taxes the bad govern-
ment would have chosen government expenditure at an even higher level. In
our situation the bad government faces a trade oﬀ. When it increases the
government expenditure, it enjoys higher level of government expenditure,
but pays for it with creating more distortions in the economy.Model
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3 Model
In this section we introduce uncertainty about the type of government, which
creates uncertainty about the government’s policy. To simplify analysis we
restrict the set of possible values of G to {GL,GH}. From the previous
section we can see that this is not a very restrictive assumption, because
this is what these governments want to do anyway. Each government faces
the decision whether to dollarize or not. If a government dollarizes, then
it has to follow US monetary policy, and ﬁscal policy has to be adjusted
to that. It will be explained later what US monetary policy means. If a
government does not dollarize, it has to decide on both ﬁscal and monetary
policy. The diﬀerence between governments is that the good government
maximizes welfare of the representative agent; and the bad government would
like to have higher than optimal level of government expenditure. The prior
probability that the government’s type is good is equal to ρ, and the prior
probability that the government’s type is bad is equal to (1 − ρ).
3.1 Timing
The prior probability that the type of government is good, ρ, is publicly
known. Each period t is divided into two subperiods. The timing is illus-
trated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Timing of the model
�
subperiod 1 subperiod 2
ρ ρ�
















In the ﬁrst subperiod the government decides whether to dollarize or not.
The state of the government s1 = (ρ,θ). Agents do not make any move inModel




In the second subperiod households ﬁrst observe the decision of the gov-
ernment d and update their belief ρd. Each household starts each period
with nominal assets holding a. This assets at the beginning of the second
subperiod are used to buy money, m, and state contingent bonds (bonds are
contingent on the government’s policy7, which is the only source of uncer-
tainty in this economy), b(G). Then each household splits into two parties
and one party goes to the labor market where it has to sign a contract on
hours worked, l, for an expected competitive wage. This decision is made
before G is observed and cannot be contingent on G. The other party goes
to the goods market, learns government policy G and uses money to buy
cash goods c1(G) and credit to buy credit goods c2(G). Since the party that
goes to the goods market observes G, these decisions are contingent on G
(they are made by households before splitting).
In the second subperiod, if the economy is dollarized then a government
does nothing in the second subperiod, otherwise it has to choose its monetary
and ﬁscal policy.
The public state of the world for agents is denoted as s2 = (ρd,d). The
state of the world for an individual agent is (s2,a). The state of the world
for a government is (s2,θ).
3.2 Government
A government moves in two stages, in the ﬁrst stage a government decides
whether to dollarize or not d ∈ {D,N} (where D− denotes dollarization
and N− no dollarization).
If the government in the ﬁrst stage decides not to dollarize, then in the
second stage it has to pick government expenditure, G ∈ {GL,GH}, and
monetary policy, µ ∈ [β,∞). To ﬁnance government expenditure govern-
ment can use lump sum taxes T ≤ ¯ T =
1+¯ ξ−β
3+¯ ξ , where ¯ T is a limit on taxes
and ξ < ¯ ξ < ξb. The introduction of the limit on taxes plays a very impor-
tant role here. The limit is such that it allows to the government to ﬁnance
GL =
ξ
3+ξ, but does not allow to ﬁnance GH =
ξb(1+¯ ξ)
(1+ξb)(3+¯ ξ). If the government
chooses GH, it has to print money. The relation between monetary policy
and ﬁscal policy is given by the balanced government budget




Thus the choice of G completely describes the behavior of the government.
Denote the strategy of government as γ(s2,θ), where γ(s2,θ)− probability
that type θ government chooses GL.
7This is to show that the result does not follow from asset markets incompleteness.Model
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If the government in the ﬁrst stage decides to dollarize, then monetary
policy is ﬁxed by this decision, we assume that then µ = µUS = β. Given
that the government runs a balanced budget, the government cannot aﬀord
GH, thus G has to be equal to GL.
The dynamics of the types of government is given by the following rule
Pr(θg|θg) = 1 − �g, Pr(θb|θg) = �g (17)
Pr(θb|θb) = 1 − �b, Pr(θg|θb) = �b
where �g,�b < 0.5.
3.3 Households
First, households observe whether there is dollarization or not d ∈ {D,N}.
Given this observation, they update their belief8 about the probability of
facing the good government, ρd, d ∈ {D,N}. The state of the world for
agents is now (s2,a). For convenience we suppressed notation by dropping
s2 whenever possible.
In each period each household decides how much to work, and how much
of cash good and credit good to consume. They form their belief about the
probability distribution over the government types, which together with the
strategy of both governments γ allows households to compute the probability
of each G, Pr(G), according to the following formula Pr(GL) = ρdγ(θg) +
(1−ρd)γ(θb) and Pr(GH) = ρd(1−γ(θg))+(1−ρd)(1−γ(θb)). Furthermore,
we assume that households are cautious, and they form their plans for all
possible values of G, even if their probabilities are zero (i.e. even for G such





Prε(G){logc1(G) + logc2(G) + ζ logG + log(1 − l)} (18)
where Prε(G) = {Pr(G), if Pr(G) ∈ [ε,1 − ε]; = ε, if Pr(G) < ε; and
= 1−ε, if Pr(G) ≥ 1−ε}. Notice that without this modiﬁcation, for G s.t.
Pr(G) = 0 households would not care about the choice of c1(G),c2(G) and
the strategies for the government (deﬁned later) would not be well deﬁned.
Denote the nominal household’s assets holdings, carried over from the
previous period, as a. Households use this assets to buy money m, and state
contingent bonds b(G), where G ∈ {GL,GH} and Prε(G)q(G) is a price of
bond b(G) that pays one if government expenditure are equal to G and zero




Prε(G)q(G)b(G) ≤ a (19)
Again we normalize all nominal variables, so that A = 1. Money is used to
8All the updating rules are presented in the Appendix.Model
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purchase cash goods subject to the cash in advance constraint.
P(G)c1(G) ≤ m (20)
where P denotes the price of goods. Nominal assets have to satisfy the
following constraint for G ∈ {GL,GH}.
µ(G)a
� (G) + P(G)c2(G) + P(G)c1(G) ≤ W(G)l
+ m − P(G)T (G) + b(G) (21)
a� (G) is multiplied by µ(G), because of normalization.
Denote the variables describing choice of households by x = (m, b(GL),
b(GH), c1(GL), c1(GH), c2(GL), c2(GH), l, a�(GL), a�(GH)) and the aggregate
policy rules by X. The aggregate policy rules are given by
X = X (s2) (22)
Recall, that before the next period starts, agents observe the value of the
government expenditure and update their believes about the type of gov-
ernment, the new belief is denoted by ρG. Afterwards, given the transition
probabilities from (17), they form the next period belief ρ�. Agents take the
governments’ strategy δ (ρ,θ), γ(s2,θ) and the believes ρ, ρd, ρG as given
and solve the following problem9










+βEρG [Eδ [V (a�(G),ρ�,d�)|θ]]}





Denote the policy functions for individuals (which solve the problem above)
as
x = x(s2,a)
3.4 Firms and Resource Constraint
For simplicity we assume the following production function
y = l (24)
Cash, credit and government goods are produced with the same technology
by the same ﬁrm, which implies that the nominal price of the three goods
is the same P. Firms are competitive which, together with the production
function, implies that
P(G) = W(G) (25)
9Note: Eδ[V (a�,ρ�,d�)|θ] = δ(ρ�,θ)V (a�,ρ�,D) + (1 − δ(ρ�,θ))V (a�,ρ�,N) and
EρG [Eδ [V (a�(G),ρ�,d�)|θ]] =
�
θ Pr(θ;ρG)Eδ [V (a�(G),ρ�,d�)|θ].Model




C1 (G) + C2 (G) + G = L (26)
where C1,C2,L are aggregate values of, respectively, cash good, credit good,
and labor supply.
We assume that the government budget is balanced so the aggregate
bonds holdings are zero
B (G) = 0 (27)
All nominal variables are normalized by the beginning of period aggregate
nominal assets holdings which, since the aggregate bond holdings add up to
zero, is equal to the stock of money. Given this normalization in each period
the aggregate stock of money is
M = 1 (28)
and the aggregate nominal assets holdings is
A = 1 (29)
3.5 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
Next we deﬁne a recursive competitive equilibrium given the decision of the
government d ∈ {D,N}, the governments’ policy rules and the updating
rules. See Appendix for the updating rules.
Deﬁnition 3 A recursive competitive equilibrium given: (1) the govern-
ments’ policy δ(ρ,θ),γ(s2,θ); (2) the event d ∈ {D,N}; and (3) the updating
rules for ρd,ρG and ρ; is a collection of functions: {P (G), W (G), q (G),
x(a,s2), X2 (s2)} and a value function V (a,ρ,d) such that
(i) x(a,s2) and V (a,ρ,d) solve the household’s problem (23).
(ii) the aggregate and the individual policy rules coincide x(1,s2) = X (s2)
(iii) producers satisfy (25).
(iv) the government budget (16) is satisﬁed.
(v) the asset markets clear, (27) − (29) are satisﬁed.
(vi) the goods market clears, (26) is satisﬁed.Model
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Equilibrium is fully described by










P(G)c1(G) = M = 1 (32)
q(G)µ(G) = β (33)
plus the government budget constraint (21), and the feasibility constraint
(26). Notice that q(G) (if diﬀerent from 1) distorts the economy away from
optimum. The optimal allocation requires c1 = c2 = 1 − l.
3.6 Markov problem
Next we deﬁne the problems solved by governments. Once the dollarization
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where ub(c1,c2,G,l) = logc1 + logc2 + ζb logG + log(1 − l), and ζb > ζ.
V b and V are deﬁned given the future government strategies γ(·), δ(·), the

























Let’s deﬁne government’s problem in the ﬁrst subperiod. Good govern-
ment wants to conduct optimal policy (it maximizes utility of the represen-
tative agent). Let δ(ρ,θg) be a policy of the good government, and let it




δV (1,ρ,D) + (1 − δ)V (1,ρ,N) (38)Model
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Bad government maximizes its own utility function. Let δ (S,θb) be a policy
of the bad government, and let it denote the probability of dollarization by




b(1,ρ,D) + (1 − δ)V
b(1,ρ,N) (39)
Notice that, in equilibrium agents, take the policy of future governments as
given, hence, by solving (38) and (39), the governments also implicitly do.
Next we deﬁne a Markov equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 4 A Markov equilibrium is: (1) policy rules δ(·),γ(·,N); and
(2) a recursive competitive equilibrium, s.t.
(i) policy of the good government, γ(·,N,θg), solves (34), given δ(·),
γ(·,N,θb) and RCE.
(ii) policy of the bad government, γ(·,N,θb), solves (35), given δ(·),
γ(·,N,θg) and RCE.
(iii) policy of the good government, δ(·,θg), solves (38), given δ(·,θb),
γ(·) and RCE.
(iv) policy of the bad government, δ(·,θb), solves (39), given δ(·,θg), γ(·)
and RCE.
(v) updating rules for ρ,ρd,ρG are consistent with strategies and dynamics
of government.Results
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4 Results
In this section we describe the behavior of governments in equilibrium.
Proposition 1 In a pure strategies Markov equilibrium:
(i) in case of no dollarization, the good government chooses G = GL (i.e.
γ(·,N,θg) = 1).
(ii) in case of no dollarization, the bad government chooses G = GH (i.e.
γ(·,N,θb) = 0).
(iii) the good government dollarizes, δ(·,θg) = 1 (unless ρ = 1, then it is
indiﬀerent).
(iv) the bad government does not dollarize, δ(·,θb) = 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
In equilibrium if the bad government does not dollarize, then in order to
ﬁnance high government expenditure it has to print money. Thus the bad
government creates distortions in the economy. Furthermore, since dollar-
ization makes it impossible to ﬁnance high level of government expenditure,
the bad government will not choose dollarization. Given this strategy of the
bad government, the good government decides to dollarize. The main reason
for dollarization is to distinguish itself from the bad government.
Notice, that after dollarization the good government has to choose G =
GL, but without dollarization it would have chosen the same. If there is no
dollarization we have the following strategies, the good government chooses
the low level of government expenditure, and the bad government chooses the
high level of government expenditure. Thus, government does not dollarize in
order to commit and escape the time inconsistency problem. The only reason
for dollarization is the fact that it allows the good government to distinguish
itself from the bad government, and thus signal its type. Dollarization allows
the good government to signal its type before the choice of labor supply is
made, so that l is not distorted, and even though it does not change the policy
(by policy we mean the choice of G) it has real eﬀects. Since dollarization
does not change the policy, real eﬀects come from the fact that dollarization
plays the role of a signaling device rather than a commitment device.
Let us stress here that the result does not rely on the fact that dollariza-
tion is not costly for the good government. The result still goes through if
the costs of dollarization are smaller than gains. Precisely, it can be shown
that dollarization is an optimal solution, even if dollarization means imple-
menting the US policy, that is not optimal from the point of view of the
dollarizing country (i.e. µUS > β), but is not ”far”from optimal (i.e. µUS is
not too big).Conclusion
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5 Conclusion
In this paper, we ﬁnd that governments faced with the lack of public trust
may ﬁnd it optimal to dollarize. We ﬁnd a very speciﬁc motivation for
how dollarization can help credibility issues. It allows the good government
to separate itself from the bad government. Thus dollarization works as a
signal. This view on dollarization diﬀers from the standard one, which views
dollarization as a commitment device. In our framework, by dollarizing the
government is not trying to escape the time inconsistency problem, because,
even without dollarization, it would have chosen the same policy (here the
low value of government expenditure). Thus dollarization plays the role of
signaling device. Dollarization has real eﬀects as it allows to bring down the
inﬂation expectations.References
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Appendix
A.1 Updating rules.

















1, if ρ = 1
0, otherwise
(41)

















1, if ρ = 1
0, otherwise
(43)
Similarly, to obtain ρ� use ρG and (17)
ρ
� = ρG(1 − �g) + (1 − ρG)�b
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
First notice that for any ρ after dollarization, d = D, we have: (C1(D),
C2(D), G, l(D)) = (1/(3 + ξ), 1/(3 + ξ), ξ/(3 + ξ), (2 + ξ)/(3 + ξ))
and for any ρ �= 1 after no dollarization, d = N, we have ρN = 0 and
(C1(N,GH), C2(N,GH), G, l(N)) = ((1 + ¯ ξ)/[(1 + ξb)(3 + ¯ ξ)], 1/(3 + ¯ ξ),
[ξb(1 + ¯ ξ)]/[(1 + ξb)(3 + ¯ ξ)], (2 + ¯ ξ)/(3 + ¯ ξ)). It is easy to show that the
current period utility after dollarization10 u(D) is higher than after no dol-
larization u(N), u(D) > u(N), thus, as the good government dollarizes
and the bad government does not dollarize, it implies that the future value
βEρG [Eδ [V (a�(G),ρ�,d�)|θ]] is increasing in ρG. Furthermore, it is easy to
show that the current period utility for the bad government after dollariza-
tion11 ub(D), is lower than after no dollarization ub(N), ub(D) < ub(N),






is decreasing with ρG.
Next we show that there do not exist proﬁtable deviations. We consider
deviations for each government.
10Denote the equilibrium value of limε→0
�
G∈{GL,GH} Prε(G)u(C1(G),C2(G),G,L) af-
ter dollarization as u(D) and after no dollarization as u(N).
11Denote the equilibrium value of
�
G∈{GL,GH} Pr(G)ub(C1(G),C2(G),G,L) after dol-
larization as ub(D) and after no dollarization as ub(N).Appendix
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Good government
Consider deviation from GL to GH. First notice that in a competitive
equilibrium: (C1(GL), C2(GL), GL, l) = (1/(3 + ξ), 1/(3 + ξ), ξ/(3 + ξ),
(2+ξ)/(3+ξ)) which is eﬃcient (instantaneous utility is the highest possible).
Furthermore notice that from government’s budget µ(GH) > β, so q(GH) <
1 and C1(GH) �= C2(GH) which, together with feasibility and the fact that
GH > GL, implies12 u(GL) > u(GH). Also, since ρG does not change, the
future value βEρG [Eδ [V (a�(G),ρ�,d�)|θ]] does not change either. Thus, in
problem (34) instantaneous utility decreases while the future value does not
change. This deviation is not proﬁtable.
Consider deviation from D to N. As we showed earlier u(D) > u(N),
thus the current period utility falls. Furthermore, since the future value
βEρG [Eδ [V (a�(G),ρ�,d�)|θ]] is increasing in ρG and this deviation changes
ρd from 1 to 0, the future value also falls. Thus in problem (38) both the
instantaneous utility and the future value decrease. Hence this deviation is
not proﬁtable.
Bad government
Consider deviation from GH to GL. First notice that in a competitive
equilibrium: (C1(GH), C2(GH), GH, l) = ((1+ ¯ ξ)/[(1+ξb)(3+ ¯ ξ)], 1/(3+ ¯ ξ),
[ξb(1 + ¯ ξ)]/[(1 + ξb)(3 + ¯ ξ)], (2 + ¯ ξ)/(3 + ¯ ξ)) and (C1(GL), C2(GL), GL,
l) = ((1 + ¯ ξ)/[(1 + ξb)(3 + ¯ ξ)], 1/(3 + ¯ ξ), ξ/(3 + ξ)], (2 + ¯ ξ)/(3 + ¯ ξ)). It is







does not change either. Thus, in
problem (35) the instantaneous utility decreases while the future value does
not change. This deviation is not proﬁtable.
Consider deviation from N to D. As we showed earlier ub(D) < ub(N),







is decreasing in ρG and this deviation changes
ρd from 0 to 1, the future value also falls. Thus, in problem (35) both the
instantaneous utility and the future value decrease. Thus this deviation is
not proﬁtable.
12Denote the equilibrium value of u(C1(GL),C2(GL),GL,L) after no dollarization as
u(GL) and the equilibrium value of u(C1(GH),C2(GH),GH,L) after no dollarization as
u(GH).
13Denote the equilibrium value of ub(C1(GL),C2(GL),GL,L) after no dollarization as
ub(GL) and the equilibrium value of ub(C1(GH),C2(GH),GH,L) after no dollarization as
ub(GH).